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Cognitive emotion regulation strategies are considered the king’s highway to control
affective reactions.Two broad categories of cognitive regulation are attentional deployment
and semantic meaning. The basic distinctive feature between these categories is the type
of conﬂict between regulatory and emotional processes for dominance, with an early
attentional selection conﬂict in attentional deployment and a late appraisal selection conﬂict
in semantic meaning. However, prior studies that tested the relative efﬁcacy of these two
regulatory categories varied the type and the degree of conﬂict. Our major goal was to test
the relative efﬁcacy of a novel attentional deployment strategy (visual search distraction) and
a classic semantic meaning strategy (reappraisal) that have a different type of conﬂict but a
matched degree of conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, visual search distraction involves a strong degree
of attentional selection conﬂict manifested in attending subtle non-emotional features that
are camouﬂaged within potent negative emotional stimuli. Reappraisal involves a strong
degree of appraisal selection conﬂict manifested in construing neutral reappraisals that rely
on potent negative emotional appraisals. Based on our theoretical model we hypothesized
and found that visual search distraction was as effective as cognitive reappraisal in down-
regulating the experience of low intensity of negative emotion (Study 1), butmore effective,
less effortful, and more strongly blocking emotional information processing than cognitive
reappraisal when regulating high intensity (Study 2). A ﬁnal study ruled out a demand
characteristics explanation by showing that participants’ expectations about how they
should feel diverged from how they actually reported feeling following regulation (Study
3). Our ﬁndings suggest that the basic difference in the type rather than degree of conﬂict
between attentional deployment and semantic meaning determines strategies’ outcome.
Keywords: attention, distraction, visual search, emotion regulation, reappraisal
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental questions that attracted early philoso-
phers as well as modern psychologists is how the mind or reason
can control basic drives or emotions. For example, Aristotle’s
postulation regarding the powerful connection between one’s cog-
nition and subsequent emotional experience has clearly inﬂuenced
modern theorem in what has become the ﬁeld of emotion reg-
ulation (Gross, 1998a,b, 2013; Koole, 2009; Webb et al., 2012
for reviews). Although emotions can be regulated in many ways
other than via cognition, cognitive regulation strategies are highly
common in daily life and have been most extensively studied
(Parkinson and Totterdell, 1999; Larsen, 2000; Gross, 2014).
According to several conceptual accounts, cognitive emotion
regulation involves recruiting deliberate executive control pro-
cesses that can change emotions at twomajor stages of information
processing – attentional deployment and semantic meaning (e.g.,
Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Kalisch et al., 2006; Gross and Thomp-
son, 2007; Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012; Suri et al., 2013 for
reviews). A Central feature in these models is that attentional
deployment and semantic meaning can be divided into sub-
categories (e.g., Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2008; McRae et al.,
2012), that vary in their level of underlying operation over-
lap. The existence of overlapping sub-categories, raise important
questions about relative efﬁcacy and about the validity of the
basic distinction between attentional deployment and semantic
meaning.
To give one example, consider a central theoretical account that
proposed a hypothetical continuum of the relationship between
sub-strategies of attentional deployment and semantic mean-
ing (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). In this continuum the distance
between an attentional deployment sub-strategy and a semantic
meaning sub-strategy denotes relative reliance onoverlap inneural
and cognitive processes. In plain words an attentional deployment
sub-strategy that is located close on the continuum to a seman-
tic meaning sub-strategy has more process overlap relative to two
sub-strategies that are further apart.
While clearly inﬂuential, the hypothetical continuum suggested
by Ochsner and Gross (2005) does not provide direct predictions
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or empirical evidence regarding expected efﬁcacy among dif-
ferent sub-categories of attentional deployment and semantic
meaning. Furthermore, as will be shown below, prior empirical
investigations tested attentional deployment sub-strategies that
have minimal process overlap with semantic meaning strategies.
Accordingly, the major goal of the present study was to extend our
conceptual framework (Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012) to predict
and test the relative efﬁcacy of a novel attentional deployment sub-
strategy that has considerable underlying process overlap with a
classic semantic meaning sub-strategy.
The starting point of our conceptual framework is that lim-
ited cognitive capacity poses processing constraints that result
in a competition or conﬂict between emotional and regulatory
processes for dominance over behavior. Drawing upon major
information processing theories (e.g., Pashler, 1998; Hübner et al.,
2010) and the process model of emotion regulation (Gross and
Thompson, 2007) we argue that deliberate cognitive regulation
starts with a top-down generated goal to inﬂuence an emotion
(Gross et al., 2011a,b), that can be achieved via early disengage-
ment from emotional processing at an attention deployment stage,
or via an engagement with emotional processing that is modulated
at a late semantic meaning stage.
The representative attentional deployment sub-strategy we
investigated in prior studies is distraction (e.g., Van Dillen and
Koole, 2007), which involves an early attentional selection type of
conﬂict between regulatory and emotional processes. Speciﬁcally,
distraction involves producing neutral thoughts that competewith
emotional information at an early selective attention stage. In
distraction there is also a minimal degree of conﬂict between regu-
latory and emotional processes because the neutral thoughts that
are formed are independent from emotional information (see sim-
ilar arguments regarding a “production function” for distraction
in Kalisch et al., 2005). The representative semantic meaning sub-
strategy we studied is reappraisal (Gross, 2002), which involves
a late appraisal selection type of conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, reappraisal
involves formingneutral reinterpretations that competewith emo-
tional appraisals at a late semantic meaning stage. In reappraisal
there is also a strong degree of conﬂict between regulatory and
emotional processes because the neutral reinterpretation seman-
tically depends on the original emotional appraisal (see similar
arguments regarding a “monitoring function” for reappraisal in
Kalisch et al., 2006).
According to our conceptual framework, these underlying char-
acteristics of distraction and reappraisal result in a differential
cost-beneﬁt efﬁcacy tradeoff (Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012).
Speciﬁcally, in distraction the beneﬁt of disengaging from emo-
tional information early, is manifested in successful modulation of
high emotional intensity information (e.g., Sheppes and Meiran,
2007, 2008; Sheppes et al., 2009; Thiruchselvam et al., 2011). How-
ever, distraction’s major costs involve memory impairments of
emotional information, and impaired long term adaptation that
in many cases requires attending and making sense of emotional
events (Wilson andGilbert,2008 for a review). By contrast, in reap-
praisal the engagement with elaborated semantic processing prior
to late modulation, is manifested in less successful modulation
of high intensity emotional information (e.g., Kanske et al., 2011;
Paul et al., 2013; Schönfelder et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the major
beneﬁt of engaging with emotional information via reappraisal
involves intact memory of emotional information and long-term
adaptation (e.g., MacNamara et al., 2011; Blechert et al., 2012).
Although our framework clearly describes the cost-beneﬁt pro-
ﬁle of distraction and reappraisal, these two sub-categories of
attentional deployment and semantic meaning have minimal pro-
cess overlap, because they vary on the type and degree of conﬂict
between regulatory and emotional processes. In the present study,
we wanted to provide a more stringent test of the differential
efﬁcacy of the two major attentional deployment and seman-
tic meaning regulation categories. We wished to maintain the
differential type of conﬂict in attentional deployment and seman-
tic meaning, but to increase the degree of conﬂict in attention
deployment so that it would resemble the high degree of conﬂict
in semantic meaning. Speciﬁcally, we wished to create a regu-
latory attentional selection option that involves a strong degree
of attentional selection conﬂict that resembles the strong degree
of semantic meaning conﬂict in reappraisal (and which is higher
than the weak degree of attentional selection conﬂict in the classic
attentional distraction).
Augmenting the degree of conﬂict in attentional deployment
requires increasing the attentional selection competition between
the emotional and regulatory process. Regulatory attentional
deployment involves selecting a neutral aspect of an emotional
situation to focus on. While emotional situations can be inter-
nal or external, the most controlled way to induce emotions
involves using external emotional situations or stimuli (e.g., using
emotional pictures). For this reason, we decided to increase the
degree of external attentional selection competition, via stimulus
based competition. Speciﬁcally, we developed a task that involves
performing continuous visual search for subtle non-emotional
features (i.e., small letters that were camouﬂaged) in emotional
pictures. The strong degree of conﬂict is between a top down reg-
ulatory goal to direct attention to a visual search for subtle letter
stimuli and between a salient attention grabbing emotional pro-
cess. Conceptually our visual search distraction is located at the
attention deployment end (i.e., “attention to non-emotional stim-
ulus attributes”) that is closest to semantic meaning in Ochsner
and Gross’s (2005) model, thus reﬂecting considerable process
overlap.
The degree of stimulus based competition in our visual search
distraction can be differentiated from prior studies that used
other forms of distraction. Prior to selectively reviewing these
prior studies it is important to note that there are numerous
conceptual accounts and supporting studies on the interactions
between cognition and emotion (see Robinson et al., 2013 for a
systematic coverage). These can be divided into two broad cate-
gories that differ in the examined directionality of the relationship
between emotion and cognition. One category involves studying
how emotions affect cognition (e.g., Pessoa, 2009; Iordan et al.,
2013; Okon-Singer et al., 2013 for reviews). While clearly inﬂu-
ential and important, a second category that involves studying
how cognition affects emotion is more directly related to emo-
tion regulation and accordingly to the present study. Speciﬁcally,
emotion regulation is most clearly deﬁned when there is a goal
to utilize cognition in order to modulate emotion (see Ochsner
and Gross, 2005; Gross et al., 2011a,b), and supporting studies
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examine how cognitive regulatory strategies inﬂuence emotional
responding. Accordingly, we limit our review to studies that can be
positioned under an emotion regulation umbrella. Speciﬁcally, in
studies that presented letters or numbers as regulatory distractions
prior to emotional picture presentation (e.g., McRae et al., 2010;
Van Dillen et al., 2013), there is no stimulus based competition
because symbols are represented andmaintained inworkingmem-
ory before the emotional stimulus is introduced. In studies that
ask participants to regulate by ﬁxing their gaze at a non-emotional
part of an emotional stimulus (e.g., Dunning and Hajcak, 2009;
Urry, 2010) there is a minor stimulus based competition, because
the attended percept is non-emotional. Last, studies that induce
regulation by presenting a mathematical equation during emo-
tional picture presentation (e.g., Kanske et al., 2011; Schönfelder
et al., 2013) involve initial stimulus based competition during
encoding but no stimulus based competition during actual per-
formance. It is important to note that in all of these studies as
well as in our visual search distraction successful disengagement
is expected, because regulatory and emotional tasks do not share
task relevance (see Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2012 for a relevant
discussion).
The major goal of the present study was to compare the rel-
ative efﬁcacy of a novel attentional deployment strategy that has
considerable underlying process overlap with a classic semantic
meaning sub-strategy. According to our conceptual framework,
the type as well as degree of conﬂict between regulatory and emo-
tional processes can determine regulatory efﬁcacy. In the present
study, although the degree of conﬂict in visual search distrac-
tion was set to resemble the degree of conﬂict in reappraisal,
visual search distraction still blocks emotional information at
an earlier processing stage relative to reappraisal. We therefore
expected that visual search distraction would be more effec-
tive than reappraisal under increased emotional challenge – high
emotional intensity. Converging support for the expected effec-
tiveness of attentional deployment despite enhanced degree of
cognitive conﬂict, comes from studies showing that attentional
selection strategies that involve high cognitive load result in
successful modulation of high intensity information (e.g., Pes-
soa et al., 2002; Erk et al., 2007; Van Dillen and Koole, 2007;
Van Dillen et al., 2009).
In the present paper we report three studies that tested the rel-
ative efﬁcacy of visual search distraction to reappraisal. In Study
1 we tested for the ﬁrst time visual search distraction and com-
pared its efﬁcacy to reappraisal when regulating low negative
emotional intensity. Based on our conceptual framework (Sheppes
and Gross, 2011, 2012) we predicted both strategies to be equally
efﬁcacious in modulating subjective negative ratings and in per-
ceived effort. In Study 2 we examined the relative efﬁcacy and
underlying operation of both regulatory conditions under low and
high intensity situations. Extending our conceptual framework
we expected that under high (but not low) emotional intensity
visual search distraction would be more efﬁcacious than reap-
praisal as manifested in negativity and difﬁculty ratings. We also
employed two performance-based measures to evaluate underly-
ing operation of both strategies. Speciﬁcally, we examined the
online stimulus based competition in visual search distraction,
and basic differential processing in both strategies. We expected
that online stimulus based competition in visual search distrac-
tion would be evident in showing that letter count performance is
inﬂuenced/reduced by high relative to low emotional intensity (see
Sheppes et al., 2014, Study 5 for related ﬁndings). We also expected
that the disengagement nature of visual search distraction and the
engagement nature of reappraisal would be evident in impaired
memory of emotional contents for visual search distraction rel-
ative to reappraisal (Sheppes and Meiran, 2007, 2008; Sheppes
et al., 2011). In Study 3 we wished to show that the relative efﬁ-
cacy results obtained with self reports cannot be fully explained by
demand characteristics. To that end we predicted that participants’
expectations about how they should feel would diverge from how
they actually feel while implementing visual search distraction.
STUDY 1: TESTING VISUAL SEARCH DISTRACTION AND
REAPPRAISAL UNDER LOW EMOTIONAL INTENSITY
Study 1 aimed to test the efﬁcacy of visual search distraction for
the ﬁrst time and to compare it to reappraisal in the context of
low emotional intensity. Based on our framework showing similar
efﬁcacy between attentional deployment and semantic meaning
for low emotional intensity stimuli, visual search distraction was
expected to be as effective and difﬁcult to implement as reappraisal
(Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012).
The experiment used a within-subjects design with ﬁve differ-
ent conditions that varied trial by trial: “look” and “search” for
both, negative and neutral pictures, and “reappraise” for neg-
ative pictures only. In the visual search distraction condition,
participants were instructed to focus on letters embedded within
negative or neutral picture and to search for as many letters as they
could ﬁnd. In the “look” conditions participants were instructed
to attend to the negative or neutral stimuli and to freely allow
themselves to experience feelings. This commonly used instruc-
tion (c.f. Coan and Allen, 2007 for a review) allowed obtaining a
control condition that isolates emotion generation from sponta-
neous regulation efforts. In the“reappraise”condition participants
were instructed to attend to emotional stimuli but to focus on a
speciﬁc aspect of the image they could think differently about in
order to change the meaning in a way that would make them feel
less negative. For example, participants were told that they could
think about how the problem or outcome depicted in the image
might soon be resolved.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-two participants (19 female, 3 male) with an age range of
18 to 29 (M = 22.20, SD = 2.91) identiﬁed themselves as Cau-
casian (27.3%),Asian (18.2%), Latino (18.2%),African-American
(9.1%), Native American (9.1%), Middle Eastern (4.5%), Mixed
(4.5%) and 9.1% declined to provide the information. All par-
ticipants were recruited at a West coast University: three of the
participants received course credit and 19 got compensation ($10
awarded).
Stimuli
There were 25 images for each of the ﬁve conditions. Seventy-ﬁve
low negative pictures (valence: M = 3.03, SD = 0.78; arousal:
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M = 5.60, SD = 0.79) for the conditions “look negative,” “reap-
praise negative,” and “search negative” and 50 neutral pictures
(valence: M = 5.14, SD = 0.73; arousal: M = 3.14, SD = 0.82)
were used for the conditions “look neutral” and “search neutral”
from the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang et al.,
2008).
To allow for random assignment of pictures to conditions,
each picture existed in an unmodiﬁed version for the “look”
and “reappraise” conditions and in a modiﬁed version with let-
ters superimposed on the picture for the “search” conditions. The
images were edited in order to embed 10 to 14 letters (24pt sized)
at multiple locations using Adobe Photoshop (see Figure 1 for an
example). The color of each letter varied based on the color of the
placement area in the picture in order to slightly camouﬂage the
letters within the image in an effort to increase the stimulus-based
competition. This way, the letters slightly blended in with their
placement spot on the picture yet were still visually detectable.
An initial pilot study was conducted to ensure that the detection
of the letters in the pictures were of approximate equal difﬁculty.
With N = 19 it was measured whether it was possible to count the
majority of letters within a 8-s time window which was used for
the actual experiment. Depending on performance, maximum ±2
letters were deleted or added, resulting in 10.44 letters per picture
on average (SD = 1.05).
Procedure
After receiving participant’s consent, participants were ﬁrst taught
what each strategy means. Participants were instructed to attend
naturally to the picture and let their feelings and thoughts
occur naturally (“look” condition), to reinterpret the meaning
of the stimulus such that they might feel less negative about it
(“reappraisal” condition; see Sheppes et al., 2014 for exact word-
ing), or to search for as many letters they can ﬁnd embedded in
the picture (“search” condition). The rating scales were explained
and how to report the number of letters they counted. Following
the teaching part participants completed ﬁve practice trials that
were identical to the actual experiment. In the actual experiment
25 pictures were randomly assigned to each of the ﬁve conditions.
The presentation of the trials was randomized with maximally
two of the same instructions in a row. Each trial started with a
3 s long ﬁxation cross, followed by a slide showing the instruction
[“look,”“reappraise,” or “search for [letter],” with an indication of
the letter to be searched for in the speciﬁc trial]. Each picture was
presented for 8 s, followed by rating scale for negativity ranging
from 1 (“not negative at all”) to 5 (“very negative”) and difﬁculty
ranging from 1 (“not difﬁculty at all”) to 5 (“very difﬁcult”) that
were each shown until the participant responded. In the “search”
condition, participants were also asked to type the number of
letters they counted. The whole experiment lasted approximately
45 min.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Negativity
A within subject one-way ANOVA was conducted to deter-
mine whether the conditions differed in negativity. Mauchly’s
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been vio-
lated [χ2(9) = 20.86, p = 0.014]; therefore degrees of freedom
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of spheric-
ity (ε = 0.68). The main effect was signiﬁcant, indicating that
the conditions differed from each other [F(2.72,57.09) = 113.39,
FIGURE 1 | An example of picture used for the “search” negative condition. In this trial participants were asked to count as many “D”s as they can. Letters
were superimposed on the original picture.
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p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.34]. Central to our predictions, post hoc
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple
comparisons revealed that while the two regulatory forms of
“search negative” (M = 2.07, SD = 0.47) and “reappraise nega-
tive” (M = 2.16, SD = 0.46) were not signiﬁcantly different from
each other [F(1,21)= 2.12,ns], both regulatory formswere associ-
ated with reduced negativity relative to the control “look negative”
condition [M = 2.61, SD = 0.53; “search negative” vs. “look neg-
ative”: F(1,21) = 34.23, p < 0.001, “reappraise negative” vs. “look
negative”: F(1,21)= 33.26, p< 0.001]. Complete details of all con-
ditions are presented in Figure 2. This pattern of results indicates
that the two emotion regulation conditions were equally effec-
tive in reducing negative emotions, and conﬁrms our hypothesis
that visual search distraction can down-regulate negative emo-
tions with asmuch efﬁcacy as reappraisal for low intensity negative
images.
Difﬁculty
A within subject one-way ANOVA was conducted to deter-
mine whether the conditions differed in difﬁculty. Mauchly’s
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been vio-
lated [χ2(9) = 34.44, p < 0.001]; therefore degrees of freedom
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of spheric-
ity (ε = 0.55). There was a signiﬁcant effect of difﬁculty
[F(2.18,45.78) = 19.73, p < 0.001, ω2 = 0.17]. Follow up analy-
ses with Bonferroni adjusted single comparisons revealed that the
two regulatory forms“search negative” (M = 2.19, SD = 0.72) and
“reappraise negative” (M = 2.17, SD = 0.59) were equally difﬁcult
to employ [F(1,21)< 1]. In addition, regulatory “Reappraise neg-
ative” resulted in more perceived difﬁculty relative to the control
“look negative” condition [M = 1.71, SD = 0.50; F(1,21) = 12.76,
p = 0.018]. Unexpectedly, regulatory “search negative” was not
signiﬁcantly different from the control “look negative” condition
[F(1,21) = 9.21, ns]. Results of all conditions are presented in
Figure 2. These results conﬁrmed our expectation that visual
search distraction and reappraisal were not signiﬁcantly different
in difﬁculty in low negative images. Somewhat unexpectedly, we
found that applying reappraisal, but not visual search distraction,
was perceived as more difﬁcult than naturally attending to pic-
tures. However, it is important to mention that both visual search
distraction and reappraisal averaged toward the “not difﬁcult at
all” side of the scale.
Search accuracy
Given that we developed a novel visual search distraction task, it
was important to show that participants perform it adequately.
Three lines of evidence suggest that this was indeed the case. First,
on average, participants showed moderately high performance
rates with 66.95% accuracy [on average participants counted
6.99 (SD = 2.27) out of 10.44 actual letters]. Second, across
participants there was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between
the number of counted letters and the actual number of letters
r(1100) = 0.37, p < 0.001. Third, counting accuracy correlated
negatively with difﬁculty ratings in both conditions [negative pic-
tures: r(550)=−0.12, p= 0.004, neutral pictures: r(550)=−0.16,
p < 0.001].
STUDY 2: TESTING VISUAL SEARCH DISTRACTION AND
REAPPRAISAL UNDER LOW AND HIGH EMOTIONAL
INTENSITY
Findings from Study 1 indicated that visual search distraction is
equally efﬁcacious emotion regulation strategy as reappraisalwhen
FIGURE 2 | Study1: averages and standard errors of negativity (gray bars) and difficulty ratings (white bars) for the different instruction conditions for
neutral and negative pictures (N = 22). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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modulating low negative intensity information. Study 2 was con-
ducted in order to extend our prior ﬁnding in two important ways.
The ﬁrst goal was to provide initial evidence for differential efﬁcacy
under increased emotional challenge. Speciﬁcally, according to
our conceptual framework (Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012) early
disengagement from emotional processing via attentional deploy-
ment should more successfully modulate high intensity emotional
responses relative to late modulation via semantic meaning. We
therefore expected that under high intensity visual search distrac-
tion would result in reduced negativity and difﬁculty relative to
reappraisal. In addition, we also expected to replicate ﬁndings
from Study 1 by showing that under low intensity reappraisal
and visual search distraction are equally effective. Our second
goal was to test the underlying operation of the two regulatory
conditions using two performance-based measures. Speciﬁcally,
in order to demonstrate that visual search distraction involves a
stimulus based competition between the regulatory and emotional
processes, we measured letter search performance for high rela-
tive to low intensity emotional information. Demonstrating that
performance is reduced in high relative to low intensity would
show that emotional information processing conﬂicts with the
top-down regulatory process. Furthermore, to demonstrate the
basic disengagement nature of distraction and basic engagement
nature of reappraisal we conducted a surprise memory test of
emotional contents and predicted that memory will be impaired
for visual search distraction relative to reappraisal (Sheppes and
Meiran, 2007, 2008; Sheppes et al., 2011). To that end, the present
study maintained the use of the three instructions (“look,” “reap-
praise,” and “search”) that were tested in two negative emotional
intensities (low and high).
METHOD
Participants
Forty-four participants between the ages of 18 and 49 (M = 23.50,
SD= 7.45, 22 females) identiﬁed themselves asCaucasian (43.2%),
Latino (18.2%) Asian or Paciﬁc Islander (15.9%), mixed (9.1%),
African-American (6.8%), and 6.8% as other. All participants
were recruited from West Coast Universities and got compensa-
tion with $10 (N = 20) or received course credit (N = 24) for
the participation in the experiment, which lasted approximately
70 min.
Stimuli
Two new sets of pictures were selected from the IAPS (Lang et al.,
2008), both including 45negative pictures of two intensities (Shep-
pes et al., 2011, 2014). One set consisted of low negativity pictures
(valence: M = 3.53, SD = 0.42; arousal: M = 5.22, SD = 0.78), the
other were highly negative (valence: M = 1.95, SD = 0.31; arousal:
M = 6.08, SD = 0.74). To ensure random assignment of pictures
to conditions each picture had an edited version for the “search”
condition to have 10 to 14 (M = 10.81, SD = 1.27) 24pt letters
embedded using Adobe Photoshop.
Procedure
Emotion regulation task. Study 2 maintained the same event-
related design, randomization rules, sequencing of consenting,
instructions, picture presentation, and ratings, as in Study 1. There
were six conditions (three instructions by two intensity levels) with
15 stimuli per condition, resulting in a total of 90 trials. After the
main experiment, a surprise memory test was introduced.
Visual search performance. Following each trial of the Search
condition participants indicated how many letters they counted.
Surprise memory task. On each of the 90 trials of the memory
test, participants were presented with two pictures (see also Shep-
pes et al., 2011 for a similar test). Participantswere told that the two
pictures differed only marginally and they should decide which of
the pictures they had seen in the previous portion of the experi-
ment (Instructions: “Throughout the ﬁrst part of our study, you
saw a series of pictures. Next, you will be presented with a set of
pairs of pictures. For each pair of pictures, there is a key differ-
ence between the pictures. You will always be given a hint, telling
you what the difference is between the pictures. Please select which
one of the pictures you sawduring the previous experiment”). One
picture had been presented during the actual experiment (e.g., a
picture of a crying baby); the other picture was a Photoshop-
modiﬁed version of the same picture. In half of these modiﬁed
pictures, a central emotional feature had been added (e.g., the
baby had extra tears); in the other half, a central emotional feature
had been excluded (e.g., the baby was missing a few tears). Above
the two pictures, a keyword pertaining to the difference between
the pictures was presented (e.g., “tears”).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Negativity
A 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out to examine the
interaction between intensity (low vs. high negativity images) and
instruction type (“look,” “search,” and “reappraise”). The main
effects of intensity [F(1,43) = 316.93, p < 0.001] and of instruc-
tion type were signiﬁcant [F(2,86) = 43.60, p< 0.001] indicating
that the negativity of the pictures, as well as the three instruc-
tion conditions had an effect on negativity ratings. These main
effects were qualiﬁed by the expected interaction [F(2,86) = 11.00,
p < 0.001]. Replicating ﬁndings from Study 1, under low inten-
sity, the two regulatory forms “search” (M = 1.67, SD = 0.62) and
“reappraise” (M = 1.75, SD = 0.46) did not differ from each other
[F(1,43)= 2.02, ns] but were both associated with lower negativity
than the control “look” condition [M = 2.12, SD = 0.62; “search”
vs. “look”: F(1,43) = 27.07, p < 0.001, “reappraise” vs. “look”:
F(1,43) = 27.77, p< 0.001]. Importantly, conﬁrming our predic-
tions for high intensity, while both regulatory forms “reappraise”
(M = 3.10, SD = 0.83) and “search” (M = 2.86, SD = 0.85) were
associated with lower negativity than the control “look” condition
[M = 3.70, SD = 0.80; “reappraise” vs. “look” F(1,43) = 39.29,
p< 0.001; “search” vs. “look” F(1,43) = 57.08, p< 0.001], regula-
tory “search” was also associated with lower negativity relative to
regulatory“reappraisal”[F(1,43)= 13.22, p= 0.002, see Figure 3].
Difﬁculty
Difﬁculty scores were subjected to a 2 × 3 repeated measure-
ment ANOVA to analyze the interaction between intensity and
instruction type. While the intensity revealed a signiﬁcant main
effect [F(1,43) = 129.89, p < 0.001], instruction type did not
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FIGURE 3 | Study 2: mean of negativity and difficulty ratings in low and high negative pictures in the three conditions (“look,” “reappraise,” and
“search”), N = 44. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
[F(2,86) = 1.99, ns]. However, the expected interaction was sig-
niﬁcant [F(2,86) = 18.18, p < 0.001] in that the instruction
conditions affected difﬁculty ratings dependent on the intensity
of the pictures. Follow up analyses with Bonferroni adjusted
single comparisons revealed that the only reliable difference indi-
cated increased difﬁculty of regulatory “reappraise” [M = 2.78,
SD = 0.85] relative to the control “search” condition [M = 2.42,
SD = 0.80] in the high negativity condition [F(1,43) = 23.33,
p < 0.001]. Information regarding all conditions appears in
Figure 3. These results provide complementary evidence to those
obtained with negativity ratings in showing that visual search
distraction required less cognitive effort (and was thus more
efﬁcacious) than reappraisal for high intensity stimuli.
Search accuracy
Percent correct of the number of counted letters per condition
was computed. Conﬁrming our predictions regarding a stimulus
based competition between regulation and emotional processes in
visual search distraction, a paired t-test revealed that accuracy in
the “search high” condition (M = 72.39%, SD = 10.34) was lower
than in the “search low” condition [M = 74.47%, SD = 9.61;
F(1,43) = 5.09, p = 0.029]. In addition, ﬁnding that emotional
intensity affected visual search performance is congruent with a
top-down generated regulatory goal that cannot completely block
emotional processing.
Memory accuracy
Percent correct of memory performance was computed. The 2 × 3
repeated measurement ANOVA showed that there was only a
main effect for instruction type [F(2,84) = 16.79, p < 0.001]. As
expected, regulatory“reappraise,”which involves engagementwith
emotional information processing, resulted in the highestmemory
scores (M = 65%, SD = 7) which was better than the control
“look” condition [M = 61%, SD = 11; F(1,42) = 4.06, p = 0.05]
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and regulatory “search” (M = 54%, SD = 10) that involves
disengagement from emotional processing [F(1,42) = 43.60,
p < 0.001]. Regulatory “Search” also resulted in worse mem-
ory relative to the control “look” condition [F(1,42) = 11.29,
p = 0.002].
STUDY 3: RULING OUT DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
EXPLANATION FOR DIFFERENTIAL EFFICACY
Findings from Study 2 supported our conceptual account by
showing that participants reported experiencing less negative and
lower perceived difﬁculty when performing visual search dis-
traction relative to reappraisal under high emotional intensity.
While encouraging, these results were obtained using subjective
self report measures that are susceptible to demand charac-
teristics. Speciﬁcally, participants may not actually feel more
negative following reappraisal relative to visual search distraction,
rather they think that they are expected to feel more nega-
tive following reappraisal and this knowledge governs their self
reports.
One powerful method to rule out this alternative explanation is
to measure how participants think they are expected to feel toward
different strategies, independent from their actual emotional expe-
rience while employing these strategies. Demand characteristics
concerns can beminimized if participants’expectations about how
they should feel diverge from how they actually feel.
To achieve this goal we ran a ﬁnal study where we asked partic-
ipants to imagine how they think they would feel while employing
different regulation strategies under different intensities, without
having them actually employ these strategies while being exposed
to different emotional intensity stimuli (see Lieberman et al., 2011
for a similar approach). We predicted that self-reports of how par-
ticipants expect to feel would diverge from those obtained in Study
2 that involved actually employing regulatory strategies.
METHOD
Participants
Forty-one participants with similar characteristics to those in
Study 2 were recruited. Speciﬁcally, participants were between
the ages of 18–49 (24 females) identiﬁed themselves as Cau-
casian (70.7%), Latino (12.2%), Asian or Paciﬁc Islander (4.9%),
African American (9.8%), and 2.4% as other. All participants
were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and received
compensation of $0.50.
Procedure
We used a within-subjects 2 × 3 design (Intensity by Instruction
Type) as in Study 2with similar procedure, except that participants
in this study were asked to imagine employing different conditions
(“look,” “reappraise,” “search”) while viewing emotional pictures
without actually employing these conditions or actually viewing
emotional pictures (Lieberman et al., 2011). Participants ﬁrst com-
pleted practice trials in which they received explanations for what
each instruction entailed that matched exactly the instructions
given to participants in Study 2. To ensure that participants read
and understood how to imagine pictures and to implement each
of the conditions, we asked them to type what they imagined for
the regulatory conditions during the practice trials.
During the actual experiment, participants imagined perform-
ing the experimental conditions while viewing different pictures.
Instead of actually presenting emotional pictures participants saw
verbal descriptions of pictures similar to those presented in Study
2 and got instructions as presented in study 2 (e.g., “Adopt the
LOOK instruction while imagining a picture of a MUTILATED
HUMAN FACE”). Each participant viewed descriptions of two
types of pictures (low and high intensity pictures) for each of the
three instructions. After every picture, participants indicated how
negative they imagined they would feel, on a scale from 1 (“not
negative at all”) to 5 (“very negative,” similar to scales used in
Studies 1 and 2), and how difﬁcult they imagined it would be to
follow the instruction and viewing the picture, on a scale from 1
(“not difﬁcult at all”) to 5 (“very difﬁcult”). Each trial consisted
of the following: the instruction to be used with the imagined pic-
ture (5 s), a verbal description of the picture to be imagined and
the instruction (10 s), the question, “How negative would you feel
after viewing the image and following the instruction?” (8 s), and
the question, “How difﬁcult would the task be?” (8 s).
RESULTS
Negativity
Negativity scores were subjected to a 2 × 3 repeated measure-
ment ANOVA to analyze main effects, as well as the interaction
between intensity and instruction type. A main effect of intensity
was found [F(1,40) = 137.85, p < 0.001] such that negativ-
ity ratings were higher when imagining high intensity pictures
(M = 3.74, SD = 0.62) than low intensity pictures (M = 2.43,
SD = 0.66). This result is important because it suggests that the
imagination of different intensities was successful in inﬂuencing
ratings in the expected direction. Mauchly’s test indicated that the
assumption of sphericity had been violated for the main effect
of instruction [χ2(2) = 7.36, p = 0.025]; therefore degrees of
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of
sphericity (ε = 0.83). The main effect of instruction was signiﬁ-
cant [F(1.71,68.27) = 3.91, p = 0.031]. These main effects were
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction [F(2,80) = 3.19, p = 0.046] in
that the instruction conditions affected negativity ratings depen-
dent on the intensity of the picture descriptions. An inspection of
the means suggested that under high intensity regulatory “search”
(M = 4.11, SD = 0.97) resulted in the highest expected negativity
followed by regulatory “reappraise” (M = 3.71, SD = 1.05) and
the control “look” condition (M = 3.41, SD = 0.94). Follow up
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that the only signif-
icant effect was that under high (but not low) intensity regulatory
“search” resulted in signiﬁcantly higher negativity ratings relative
to the control “look” condition [F(1,80) = 10.88, p = 0.004, see
Figure 4]. These results suggest that participants expect that the
Search strategy would be least effective under high intensity, a
result that is opposite to Study 2 ﬁndings that were obtained while
participants actually employed the different conditions.
Difﬁculty
Difﬁculty scores were subjected to a 2 × 3 repeated measurement
ANOVA to analyze the interaction between intensity and instruc-
tion type. There was a main effect of intensity [F(1,40) = 99.79,
p < 0.001] such that imagining high intensity negative pictures
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FIGURE 4 | Study 3: mean of negativity and difficulty ratings in low and high imagined negative pictures in the three conditions (“look,” “reappraise,”
and “search”), N = 41. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
(M = 2.18, SD = 0.63) while employing the instructions was
more difﬁcult than imagining low intensity pictures (M = 3.74,
SD = 0.62). There was also a main effect of instruction type
[F(2, 80) = 11.70, p < 0.001]. The main effects were qualiﬁed
by a signiﬁcant interaction [F(2, 80) = 5.76, p = 0.005] such
that the instruction conditions affected difﬁculty ratings depen-
dent on the intensity of the pictures. Follow up comparisons
(Bonferroni corrected) revealed that in the high intensity con-
dition, regulatory “search” (M = 3.72, SD = 0.97) was rated
as signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult than the control “look” condition
[M = 2.80, SD = 1.05, F(1,80) = 35.7, p < 0.001], and reg-
ulatory “reappraise” [M = 3.28, SD = 1.04, F(1,80) = 7.97,
p = 0.043, see Figure 4]. In the low intensity condition, regulatory
“reappraise” (M = 2.56, SD = 0.97) was rated as signiﬁcantly
more difﬁcult than the control “look” condition [M = 1.85,
SD = 0.88, F(1,80) = 12.05, p = 0.002], while regulatory “search”
was not signiﬁcantly different than either the control “look”
condition nor regulatory “reappraise.” These results complement
the negativity results in showing that participants’ expectations
regarding the difﬁculty of the “search” option are opposite to
actual implementation. It also bears noting that expected results
regarding reappraisal are also opposite to those reported in
Study 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Cognitive emotion regulation strategies involve exerting executive
control processes that can change emotional information pro-
cessing at an attentional deployment or semantic meaning stages.
These two broad regulation categories can be further divided to
sub-strategies that vary on the degree of overlap in their under-
lying cognitive operation, which leads to differential efﬁcacy.
Despite a continuum of possibilities, prior studies concentrated
on attentional deployment and semantic meaning strategies that
had minimal underlying operation overlap because they varied in
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the type and degree of conﬂict between regulatory and emotional
processes. The major goal of the present study was to test the
relative efﬁcacy of a novel attentional deployment sub-strategy
(visual search distraction) that has a matched degree of conﬂict
with a classic semantic meaning sub-strategy (reappraisal) under
low and high negative intensities.
Based on our conceptual framework (Sheppes and Gross, 2011,
2012) we hypothesized and found that visual search distrac-
tion was as effective as cognitive reappraisal in down-regulating
the experience of low intensity of negative emotion (Study 1),
but more effective and less effortful than cognitive reappraisal
when regulating high intensity (Study 2). Underlying mecha-
nisms of visual search distraction revealed that its operation
is partially hindered by negative intensity, and that it blocks
emotional information from being processed and remembered
relative to reappraisal (Study 2). A ﬁnal study demonstrated
that the relative efﬁcacy results obtained with self-reports cannot
be fully explained with demand characteristics, because partic-
ipants’ expectations about how they should feel diverged from
how they actually felt while implementing visual search distraction
(Study 3).
Our ﬁnding that visual search distraction can be more efﬁca-
cious than reappraisal under high intensity extends our conceptual
framework (Sheppes and Gross, 2011, 2012) in important ways.
Our framework argues that disengaging early from emotional
information processing via attentional deployment strategies (e.g.,
with distraction) can more successfully block high intensity
information relative to engaging with emotional information
processing prior to a late modulation (e.g., with reappraisal).
However, prior empirical support for our framework comes
from studies that contrasted an attentional deployment strategy
(distraction) that is different from a semantic meaning strategy
(reappraisal) in the type of conﬂict (attention selection con-
ﬂict in distraction vs. semantic meaning conﬂict in reappraisal)
and degree of conﬂict (minimal in distraction and strong in
reappraisal) between regulatory and emotional processes. In the
present study, we were able to show that differential efﬁcacy in
favor of attentional deployment is maintained under high inten-
sity, even when the degree of conﬂict between the regulatory
and emotional processes resembled the high level of conﬂict
in reappraisal. These ﬁndings suggest that the basic difference
in the type rather than the degree of conﬂict between atten-
tional deployment and semantic meaning determines strategies’
outcome.
An increase in degree of conﬂict was operationalized in the
present study as the stimulus based competition between the
regulatory and emotional processes. A conceptual continuum
of regulatory options that vary on this feature can be made.
Minimal stimulus based competition is evident when distrac-
tion involves a production of unrelated neutral thoughts (e.g.,
Sheppes and Meiran, 2007, 2008) or during cognitive load main-
tenance in working memory (e.g., McRae et al., 2010; Van Dillen
et al., 2013). Low stimulus based competition is evident when
attention and accordingly perception is ﬁxed at a single non-
emotional part of an emotional stimulus (e.g., Dunning and
Hajcak, 2009; Urry, 2010). Intermediate stimulus based com-
petition is evident when the encoding but not maintenance of
cognitive load is occurring simultaneously with picture presenta-
tion (e.g., Kanske et al., 2011; Schönfelder et al., 2013). Last, high
stimulus based competition is evident in our visual search dis-
traction that involves disengaging from emotional processing by
actively scanning multiple subtle non-emotional features that are
embedded in potent emotional stimuli. Indeed in the present study
we found performance based evidence for stimulus based com-
petition in showing that visual search performance is impaired
when emotional intensity is high relative to low. The disengage-
ment feature of visual search distraction was observed in impaired
memory of emotional information relative to engagement
reappraisal.
Like any other regulatory option visual search distraction can
be viewed as a strategy that has a cost-beneﬁt proﬁle. It may be
beneﬁcial because it can serve as a crutch in times when our cogni-
tive resources are used up or when facing high intensity situations.
However, because the emotional stimulus is not processed, it may
lack the long term beneﬁt that requires making sense of emotional
events in order to adapt (see Ayduk and Kross, 2008; Thiruch-
selvam et al., 2011). This particular cost can prove maladaptive
and function as a risk or maintaining factor in psychopathol-
ogy. Speciﬁcally, several anxiety disorders entail a tendency to
over-generalize a disengagement or avoidance from emotional
information processing (see Foa and Kozak, 1986; Campbell-Sills
and Barlow, 2007 for reviews). Disengagement usually starts in
response to focused high intensity emotional situations, but if
overly used it can constrain healthy functioning and lead to mal-
adaptive anxiety response. Disengagement can also contribute to
maintenance of existing anxiety disorders, because it does not
allow one to question the validity of high intensity fears.
On average individuals who used visual search distractions
reported it was relatively simple to implement and that it resulted
in feeling less negative. Although, these ﬁndings were obtained
with self reports, Study 3 helped minimizing demand character-
istics effects. Speciﬁcally, we found that participants’ expectations
about how they should feel diverged from how they actually felt
while implementing visual search distraction. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that individuals are not fully aware of the potential beneﬁts
of employing visual search distraction. While interesting this fea-
ture may lead to non-optimal emotion regulation choice that is
important for healthy adaptation (see Sheppes and Levin, 2013;
Sheppes, 2014, for reviews).
This study showed the effectiveness of an innovative emotion
regulation strategy, but several improvements could be made in
the future. Although visual search and classic attentional distrac-
tion (e.g., Sheppes and Meiran, 2007) appear to behave similarly
when compared to reappraisal and thereby conﬁrm and extend
the model by Sheppes and Gross (2011), future studies should fur-
ther investigate the role of the degree of conﬂict in determining
regulatory effectiveness. One option is to parametrically change
the degree of conﬂict in visual search distraction by manipulat-
ing the salience of the embedded letters in the visual search. A
second option is to compare visual search distraction to classic
attentional selection distraction. The advantage of both of these
options is that they hold the regulatory attentional selection cat-
egory constant which would allow testing more directly whether
differential degree of conﬂict affects regulatory effectiveness.
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A second limitation is that the preset results were obtained for
only one type of emotional inducing stimuli namely emotional
pictures. Although, our focus on visual search distraction required
using visual stimuli, our data precludes us from knowing whether
attentional selection strategies that involve enhanced degree of
conﬂict would be effective with other types of emotional stimuli.
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